Financial reform bill

Did we tame the beast: views
on the US Financial Reform Bill
Duke University’s Prof Lawrence Baxter
takes a microscope to the ‘Dodd-Frank’ Bill
finding a veritable ’Micrographia’ of doubt.
THIS paper was written in anticipation
of the US Financial Reform Bill’s final
passage through Congress prior to being
signed into law by President Obama on
July 5 – obviously this is now not the
case. The Bill currently before Congress
was devised to address problems associated with the global financial crisis (GFC)
of 2007-2009.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, which by its very
title indicates the complicated nature of the
reforms, is actually not yet law. The Bill, which
I will refer to as“Dodd-Frank”for the rest of
this paper, now hangs in limbo, having been
passed by the House of Representatives and
the Senate, subsequently reported out of
Conference Committee and finally approved
by the House, but not quite yet enacted by
Congress.
Two more votes remain in the Senate.
The first will be whether to stop with a
cloture vote an attempted filibuster by the
Republican minority, which would prevent
the bill from coming to a floor vote. If the
Senate votes for cloture a second vote will
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then approve the legislation by a likely margin of about 59 votes to 40. Only then can
the Bill go to the President for signature.
These final votes are scheduled for next
week when Congress returns from the July
Fourth recess. So we will not know until next
week whether 12 months of intense effort in
Congress and two years of aftershocks from
the GFC will actually lead to financial reform
in the United States. If, however, DoddFrank is signed into law, the United States
will become the first major nation to honour its commitment to the G20 to reform its
financial system.
Dodd-Frank in general
This legislation is neither uncontroversial
nor sure to be effective. The Bill has engendered a range of reactions, ranging from savage criticism to effusive self-promotion by
Congressional leaders and the President. At
the conservative end of the spectrum, a professor at Stanford writes that Dodd-Frank
is a “financial fiasco.” The ubiquitous Judge
Richard Posner, having recently turned his
attention to the subject of banking regulation and become a Keynesian after years in
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the Milton Friedman camp, has described
the bill as “politics in the worst sense.”
Liberal commentators have mixed reactions
too, with Lynn Parramore declaring the bill
to be“both disappointing and inspiring” and
Chris Bowers, co-founder of the organisation known as OpenLeft, advocating that
despite its shortcomings it is still worth supporting and the last chance to “really take
on the banks.” Even Paul Volcker, former
chairman of the Fed and after whom one of
the major new activity restrictions in DoddFrank is named, is said to be disappointed
with how that restriction – the Volcker Rule
– was watered down in order to secure
Republican votes. There is indeed enough in
the massive 2,307-page bill to delight, anger
and/or befuddle everybody to some extent.
Not a complete bill
Dodd-Frank also conspicuously avoids
two major areas of greatly needed reform,
namely regulatory consolidation among the
nation’s illogical morass of financial regulators, and restructuring of the GSE system
designed to promote easy access to home
mortgages, such as Fannie Mae and Freddy
Mac. These dysfunctional organisations, in
the view of many, were among the significant contributors to the GFC.
Finally, implementation of the Bill awaits
over 200 rule-making processes by the
implementing agencies! These regulatory
elaborations will add considerable depth to
the legislative framework and their outcome,
far from predictable, will depend on further
intense lobbying by all the stakeholders at
the less visible level of the administrative
process.
Yet there is no doubt that Dodd-Frank
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will profoundly reshape financial services for
decades to come. There is much in it that I
would praise.
What’s hot
Consumers have received short shrift in
recent years as financial products have
become more byzantine, and only a predatory lender, auto dealer, or Washington lobbyist would argue that is it acceptable that
ordinary consumers should have to engage
professional assistance merely to understand the terms of their mortgages or credit
card agreements. As the damage incurred
by complex – some would say unnecessary – products sold aggressively to investors has escalated it is also important that
the professionals in the business be placed
under increasing standards of care in their
disclosures and conduct; this, too, is partly
addressed in the legislation.
The derivatives market is presently rather
like the foreign exchange market of a decade
ago: money is made as much through the
privileged access to information as through
actual value added, and in the case of derivatives which can have such massive contingencies the strengthening of the exchange
infrastructure and market transparency is an
urgent necessity. The introduction of proper
supervision is also to be welcomed.
Mission accomplished?
Given space restrictions, it is impossible to
give a wide-ranging summary of the DoddFrank reforms. Instead, one’s intent is to focus
on a single important question; namely, does
the legislation squarely face and adequately
address the problem of financial instability so as to significantly reduce the risk of
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another collapse in the financial system?
The threat of destabilisation is the beast that
lurks under the gigantic, volatile and labile
financial system upon which global prosperity and security depends. Have we in the
United States done our part to challenge this
beast?
My view is that we have not. We have
made a partial and reasonably good faith
attempt, but we have not truly come to grips
with one of the central causes of financial
instability, namely the massive global financial institutions now roaming the planet.
I will adopt the term in regulatory use for
these institutions: large, complex financial
institutions, or LCFIs. Just as we saw with the
failure of Lehman Brothers and the near collapse of AIG, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Royal
Bank of Scotland, Lloyds and others in 2008,
the failure of any one LCFI would inflict serious disruption on the entire financial system.
Issue of ‘too-big-to-fail’
These and many other financial institutions
are now more or less openly acknowledged
to be“too important to fail,”“too big to fail”or,
more euphemistically, “systemically important.” Despite bold declarations and efforts
in the legislation to restrict future government assistance, the Dodd-Frank legislation
does not do enough to address this problem
and, for as long as these LCFIs operate at
their current scale and complexity, the financial system will remain fragile and vulnerable
to massive sudden shocks.
It is true that Dodd-Frank purports to
deal with the problem and has been sold as
having dealt with it. But in the ultimate analysis it has not. This is because Dodd-Frank
assumes that LCFIs can be safely operated,
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regulated and, if necessary, liquidated.
However, as long as LCFIs are permitted to
operate at their current scale and complexity they will not and cannot in practice be
allowed to fail, no matter what the legislation permits or prohibits and no matter what
Senator Dodd, Congressman Frank or officials at the Treasury Department declare to
the contrary.
Financial stability
Of all the anxiety stemming from the GFC,
perhaps the greatest is fear of widespread
domestic and international financial instability. While specific and localised bank failures are surely always painful, they seem
to be part of the normal functioning of
economic systems – a manifestation of the
Schumpeterian “creative destruction” that
ensures the very survival of capitalism itself.
It is not such specific failures but rather widespread breakdowns of the kind we experienced with the GFC that instil the real fear.
Prevalence of financial crises
This fear is well founded. The GFC is only
the latest in a long line of similar crises.
Many earlier crises are well known, including: the Dutch Tulip Mania of 1637; South
Sea Bubble of 1720 ; Mississippi Company in
1720; Great Crash of 1929; and, of course,
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.
Crashes have occurred in almost every
economic region of the globe. It might come
as a surprise to learn that there have been
more than 112 systemic-scale financial crises
in over 90 countries over the past 30 years.
Indeed, such crises are now twice as prevalent today than they were a century ago. And
we don’t seem to be making much progress
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in eliminating them. Systemic risk has really
only recently attracted much attention.
The first glimmers of concern arose in
1974 when a relatively small financial institution in Germany, Bankhaus Herstatt, failed
unexpectedly, generating overnight shocks
to financial institutions in other countries
that were exposed to losses resulting from
their inability to settle currency trades with
Herstatt in the later time zones.
A much more massive version of the systemic phenomenon occurred when Lehman
Brothers was allowed to fail on September
15, 2008. Lehman became the largest bankruptcy in US history even though the investment bank was by no means the largest US
financial institution. Credit markets froze
overnight as financial institutions took
defensive action to mitigate their exposures
and anticipate potential losses. This was the
event that effectively plunged the world into
the GFC.
Founding of Basel Committee
The Herstatt failure prompted the creation
by the G10 of a Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices,
known as the “Basel Committee.” Over the
past three decades the Basel Committee
and another committee working out of its
offices and created by the G20, the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) (before 2009 the
Financial Stability Forum), have worked on
various ways to reduce the vulnerability of
the global financial system.
Obviously these institutions failed miserably in preventing or even anticipating
the current crisis – a story too complicated
to investigate here today. Nevertheless, our
dim understanding of what leads to such
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crises, if not our ability to stop them, has
actually improved. We have better economic
data at both the global and domestic levels
and regarding the histories of specific financial institutions. Clear patterns do seem to
emerge in the cycle from boom to bust. In
recent months governments and markets
have been reacting apprehensively to all
kinds of signals of possible systemic failure,
ranging from the risk of sovereign defaults
in Dubai and the Eurozone to possible asset
bubbles in Beijing and Shanghai.
Financial scale and scope
Fluctuating with the ebb and flow of economic globalisation are the fortunes of
financial institutions themselves. Their scope
and interconnectedness are increasing as
fast as the spread of global finance, and their
individual sizes have escalated at spectacular rates in recent years. There are now 180
financial institutions with assets greater than
$50 billion, with 39 each having more than
$500 billion in assets. The largest (currently
BNP Paribas) holds just under $3 trillion.
Many of these institutions have been kept
alive only through massive injections of
public funding. Among these financial institutions, many, including some of the biggest,
have grown rapidly, more than doubling in
size over the past five to 10 years.
Bank of England study
Despite their assertions of efficiencies of
scale, these financial conglomerates have
long ceased to be as efficient as their smaller
counterparts. So their economic value is
questionable. What is worse is that the value
of the de facto public subsidies they enjoy is
substantial.
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A respected study by the Bank of England
recently suggested that the public subsidy of the five largest banks in the United
Kingdom has been running at $30 billion per year. A similar study in the United
States suggests that the subsidy derived
from the US Treasury’s TARP programme for
the top 18 banks is approximately $34 billion/ year. In both studies the largest banks
take the lion’s share of this public subsidy.
Furthermore, both studies look at only one
aspect of various state-backed advantages
large financial institutions enjoy; there are
indeed various other forms of support that
generate a broader aggregate subsidy.
The international financial system is
greatly dependent on the fortunes of these
ultra large financial institutions. Difficulties
experienced by any one such institution
leads to one of two inevitable results: either
additional public subsidies are required to
keep the institution open, or letting it go into
bankruptcy will lead to widespread financial
disruption and even general instability – as
witnessed during the GFC. This is why such
institutions that have become known in the
United States as TBTF.
Dodd-Frank solution
How does the Dodd-Frank Bill address this
problem? One obvious way would have
been to impose limitations on the size of
financial institutions. An amendment proposed by two senators did indeed place such
an option squarely before the Senate. Their
amendment, however, met fierce opposition from the large banks and the Treasury
Department and was eventually defeated.
Instead Dodd-Frank delegated the problem
to the regulators. The regulatory approach to
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the problem is to: supervise the health of the
individual institutions themselves (so-called
“microprudential” regulation); monitor the
systemic inter-dependence of each financial
institution as they interact within the broader
financial system (so-called “macroprudential” regulation); and promote, through the
medium of the G20, Basle Committee and
FSB, greater international co-operation in
order to address the transborder interconnections among LCFIs.
Regulatory approach
Consistent with this regulatory oriented
approach, and accepting the position of the
US Treasury Secretary that regulators should
possess the discretion to act appropriately
when dangers arise, Dodd-Frank creates
an elaborate and graduated framework for
regulatory action.
1.) The Bill creates sophisticated machinery designed to anticipate and react to the
buildup of systemic risk. This consists of the
new Financial Stability Oversight Council,
informed by a new Office of Financial
Research in the Treasury Department, which
has the responsibility of collecting economic
data and producing analysis to identify and
monitor emerging systemic risks. DoddFrank also casts a wide net over any financial
institution that might contribute to this risk,
whether it be a bank or not.
2.) Regulators are empowered to implement
progressively tougher standards, ranging
from capital requirements to activity restrictions to limits on single counterparty exposures, in order to prevent such systemically
significant institutions from becoming more
risky. The Bill prohibits certain types of conduct ex ante, though the implementation
213

periods are lengthy and it is far from clear
that such activities, for example proprietary
trading which will be banned by the socalled Volcker Rule, are really all that important in generating systemic risk, particularly
given the exemptions created by the Bill and
the lengthy implementation periods.
The regulators can also extend this
framework of supervision and limitations to
financial institutions designated “systemically significant,” even if they are not banks.
Such systemically significant institutions
will also be required to develop their own
“funeral plans” which would provide blueprints for their orderly shutdown when
things go wrong.
3.) Dodd-Frank prohibits direct bailouts,
either by the lender of last resort or deposit
insurer, that benefit an individual bank. The
Fed may only provide emergency lending
on a broad basis, and not solely for a specific
institution, and then only with the approval
of the Treasury Secretary. The FDIC, which
protects the deposit insurance funds and
depositors, has to get special – ultimately
Presidential and Congressional – approval in
order to guarantee debt in order to prevent
a bank run.
4.) New speedy resolution or liquidation
procedures, similar to those that already
apply to banks, are created for any financial
institution deemed systemically significant.
The FDIC, which is already the receiver for
failed banks, will wind up financial institutions forced into this bankruptcy system.
Yet the final iterations of Dodd-Frank
have been met with many headlines
declaring that the bill will not in fact have
killed TBTF. Gretchen Morgenson of the
New York Times identified “cutting big and
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interconnected financial entities down to
size”as one of the most important objectives
for successful reform. In her assessment“the
bill fails completely.”
Dodd-Frank failings
I believe Morgenson’s evaluation is correct.
We will have another crisis soon enough;
indeed such crises seem ultimately unavoidable. If Congress, after the kind of crisis we
have just been through, cannot itself impose
scale limitations on very large financial institutions, I don’t think the regulators will ever
be in a position to shut them down. And if
financial institutions of current scale and
complexity continue to operate, I don’t think
that they can be shut down when a crisis
occurs.
Complexity of LCFIs
The primary reason for this gloomy outlook
is that financial institutions have evolved to a
degree of complexity and size where it is not
only more likely that they will fail. It is also
practically impossible to let them do so without the cure being worse than the disease.It
is more likely that financial Leviathans will
run into serious difficulties because:
(a) they are now beyond the level of complexity at which risk can safely and reliably
be managed; and, (b) it is unrealistic to think
that current resources and techniques of
regulation can meaningfully monitor them;
and, (c) their sheer scale and complexity of
operations spawns such deep mutual interconnectedness that the failure of any one
creates the serious risk of failure by many
others, as well as schools of smaller financial
institutions.
Such companies, let alone their
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regulators, are still learning the skills of and
developing the tools for the complex risk
management necessary to operate on a
large, global scale in a highly labile global
financial market.
It is not just credit and market risks that
they must master (they have acquired considerable experience at addressing these
types of risk); it is also an increasingly complicated level of operational risk, in which
the diversity of such companies, coupled
with the escalating sources of unexpected
dangers – both functional and geographic
– creates a situation with which BP would
surely now identify: you simply will not see
the lightning that hits you. I have yet to see a
serious risk management or regulatory plan
that adequately or reassuringly addresses
such risk complexity.
Intervention paradox
It is less likely than ever that regulators will
use their powers to shut down a large, systemically risky institution because of what
one might label the intervention paradox:
just when the need to precipitate terminal
action to seize a financial institution is greatest, the incentives not to do so, and the ability of the institution itself to resist seizure, are
also highest.
The result is that such institutions are
kept open to the point where they either
become zombies – publicly subsidised and
ultimately non-productive (i.e. not sustainably profitable) wards of the state – or their
collapse creates far greater damage on other
institutions than should have been allowed.
To elaborate on this paradox, when
financial institutions get into difficulty, financial agencies have two main responsibilities.
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If the problem for the institution is essentially one of liquidity then the central bank’s
job is to act as a lender of last resort.
Paradox elaborated
If, on the other hand, there is a risk of a run
on the bank, or if there is a danger that the
bank’s failure will dissipate more capital than
will be sufficient to cover repayment of the
deposits, then the deposit insurer’s job is to
take “prompt corrective action” to pre-empt
the failure or, if this action is already too late,
to seize the bank and put it through fasttrack receivership. When the bank is very
large and systemically significant, the temptation for both a central bank and deposit
insurer is to try to keep the financial institution open in the hope that it will make it
through the crisis and be able to rebuild.
Small banks are relatively easy to close,
and in the US the FDIC regularly closes failing banks with little disruption. But the closure of a complex large bank is both costly
to the federal insurance funds and carries the
risk of systemic damage to other financial
institutions.
IMF observations
As a recent study by the International
Monetary Fund concluded: “The failure of a
systemically important institution increases
the likelihood of failures among non-systemic institutions. This means that any regulator will be more lenient with a systemically
important institution.” Furthermore, the
actions of both types of regulators (lender
of last resort and prompt corrective actor)
become mutually reinforcing and likely to
perpetuate the survival of weak but very
large institutions. And this is before even
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taking into account the intense lobbying
power that such large institutions possess,
which will almost certainly be deployed as
a political barricade against any regulatory
aspirations to the contrary.
The Dodd-Frank system would appear
to eliminate the “too big to fail” possibility
by prohibiting bailouts in all but the most
restricted circumstances.
But consider why the possibility of a bailout exists in the first place: the institutions
we are talking about would generate all the
conditions necessary for both emergency
loans from the Fed and debt guarantees
by the FDIC, precisely because their failure
would have major systemic consequences
the world over.
Restructuring TBTFs
So while the prudential measures developed by Dodd-Frank might in theory help
reduce the threat of systemic danger, the
continued existence of LCFIs, the failure of
which would have major systemic consequences, makes another major disruption to
financial stability and another bailout all but
inevitable.
There is, in my view (and the view of
many others) only one way to install systemic blowout preventers so as to mitigate,
at least, the scale of damage caused by the
next financial crisis. This is to limit the size of,
or substantially restructure into safer, more
self-sealing subcomponents, the denizens
that operate within the system. Limiting
bank size will not entirely reduce complexity (which generates operational risk and
the possibility of institution failure) or interconnectedness (which generates systemic
risk). Indeed an industry paper makes the
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argument that size is not the problem; rather
it is interconnectedness, a feature shared by
smaller as well as larger institutions.
Big equals unmanageable
Interconnectedness is indeed the capillary
network of systemic risk. But the argument
that size is irrelevant misses the point: interconnectedness increases exponentially with
size and above a certain scale risks start to
become unmanageable.
So limiting financial institution size
would be not for the purpose of improving
safety. Large scale virtually guarantees the
presence of excessively complex risk. More
important, the systemic impacts of failure are
magnified by size.
The managerial culture of banking exacerbates the risks generated by scale. The
advocates of large-scale banking, including
most of the executives, tend to favour the
centralised, branch and integrated model of
universal banking because this model is perceived to be more efficient.
Over-centralisation risk
A unified corporate structure enables the
organisation to leverage its capital over all
of its operations and avoid the intra-affiliate
legal, accounting and operational impediments among subsidiaries. Yet this same
operational consolidation also conducts
risk more freely across the corporate entitity.
Some national regulators require foreign
banks to establish local, separately capitalised and operated subsidiaries precisely in
order to facilitate more effective domestic
supervision. This is part of the attraction
of the non-operating holding company
(NOHC) structure favoured by the United
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States and some other countries. Affiliate
transaction restrictions help to prevent transmission of risk between the operating subsidiaries, and it might be possible to refine
structurally separate components further
to produce safer conglomerates that can be
managed more coherently and that contain
stronger internal insulations when risks get
out of control.
Dodd-Frank indeed uses this technique
to address the risks posed by hedge fund
activity for banks by requiring that such activities be“pushed out”into separate subsidiaries. Whether the LCFIs would welcome this
approach is another matter, since the interaffiliate restrictions would necessarily reduce
the “efficiencies” enjoyed by folding diverse
operations into more monolithic corporate
entities.
Rethinking the framework
In the absence of sound policy reasons for
assuming the greater risks that such institutions add to the system, it is therefore hard to
see why it makes sense to continue, like deer
in the headlights, to watch financial institutions reach new scales that are beyond the
capacity of regulators to supervise properly,
at least with techniques currently available,
and their own capacity to provide credible
guarantees that they can be operated safely.
Perhaps a combination of learning and
technology will ultimately render very largescale banking safe. Yet even if this were the
case, Dodd-Frank ultimately relies upon an
outdated framework for matching the new
world of finance.
This is because, in my opinion, DoddFrank is conceptually misconceived as a
vehicle for promoting systemic financial
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safety. The global financial system is evolving so rapidly, is so volatile and so labile that
it possesses the characteristics of a complex
adaptive system – one that more resembles
the weather than a product of intelligent
central design.
Prof Arner et al
If the global financial system is really more
accurately understood as a truly complex
environment in the scientific sense, then trying to regulate modern global finance will
require more nuanced, skilled and rapidly
reactive regulation than commands, prohibitions or greater enforcement powers. New
techniques of adaptive regulation must be
developed to meet the fast-paced world of
payments, financial dealing and innovation.
Douglas Arner and his co-authors have
recently completed major studies directed
toward comprehensive redesign of the
global financial system and its regulation, so
I would direct the audience to that study for a
fuller understanding of the overall issues that
must be addressed.
Closing remarks
I will content myself by noting, in closing,
that there are some elements of the financial
ecosystem that can be controlled upfront.
One of them is the size of the participants,
so that at least the environmental damage
caused by these players does not destroy the
habitat for other creatures.
In this important respect the DoddFrank Bill has avoided dealing with a central vulnerability to the financial system.
This reform will almost certainly be back on
the table after the next disaster, the odds of
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